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Introduction 
The extent of regulation over the right to work in particular fields is of on-going 
concern.  These regimes are currently state-based, creating various anomalies.  In this 
paper, I outline the practical difficulties caused by the present patchwork quilt of 
different regulation of the right to work in particular fields, before considering the 
extent to which Australia’s constitutional arrangements might provide a remedy for 
red tape in this regard.  In so doing, a recent High Court decision will be considered in 
some detail, along with a comparison of how this issue has been dealt with in other 
parts of the world. 
 
The Problem 
The problem has at least been recognised by government, with the issue of national 
recognition of trade qualifications remaining on the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG) list of Top 10 hotspots, or worst regulatory impediments to 
economic activity.
1
  The Business Council of Australia has counted 149 occupational 
licences in New South Wales, 136 in Victoria, 87 in Western Australia, 69 in the 
Australian Capital Territory, and 47 at the Commonwealth level.
2
   
 
These arrangements might have made sense in one era, but are increasingly 
questionable today.  There is clear evidence that business is increasingly being done 
across State lines.  By the end of the 2007 financial year, more than 31, 700 
businesses in Australia were operating in more than one jurisdiction, with 4300 
operating in all nine jurisdictions.  This figure has increased by 70% since 2003.
3
 
 
These problems were identified by the Australian National Training Authority 
(ANTA), in its 2002 Report A Licence to Skill.  ANTA had been required to develop 
training packages at the national level, in an effort to create an integrated national 
vocational education and training system.  These packages would ensure that people 
wishing to enter particular trades had a series of defined skills and abilities.  However, 
the Report found that these packages were not being used by all bodies responsible for 
industry licensing.  Often additional factors were being used as the basis for 
determining competency in a particular field; sometimes the factors used were 
actually inconsistent with the nationally developed standards.  Requirements 
continued to differ across jurisdictions.
4
  Although there had been some success with 
Australian Mutual Recognition Agreement in terms of portability of skill recognition, 
the Agreement had its limitations.
5
  Further, there is an ongoing COAG process to fix 
the identified problems.  However, progress has been slower than first anticipated. 
                                                 
1
 The list comprises rail safety regulation, occupational health and safety, national trade measurement, 
chemicals and plastics, development assessment arrangements, building regulations, environmental 
assessment and approvals processes, business name, Australian Business Number and related business 
registration processes, personal property securities, and product safety. 
2
 Reshaping Australia’s Federation: A New Contract for Federal-State Relations (2006) p12 
3
 ABS Catalogue No 8165.0 Counts of Australian Businesses, December 2007. 
4
 The Report refers to this as the ‘rail gauge’ problem, in terms of training, with analogies to the 
problems associated with different rail gauges in Australia. 
5
 Specifically, it did not assist where occupations were regulated differently across jurisdictions, and 
did not assist where workplace requirements were mandated by legislation, but for which no licence or 
registration was issued (p6). 
 The idea of creating nationally-based requirements to assess workplace competency 
was to ‘reduce barriers to the mobility of labour between jurisdictions’.6  Existing 
licensing regimes inhibited this.
7
  Some specific examples include hairdressing, where 
no licence is necessary in Victoria but is required in New South Wales.  A Victorian 
hairdresser wishing to move to New South Wales would have to study at a NSW 
TAFE in order to gain a NSW licence.  Similarly in nursing – a Northern Territory 
nurse working as an immunisation provider can do so without a licence; however if 
she/he wished to move to Victoria, she/he would need to undertake a further VET 
course.
8
  The Productivity Commission has noted the impact of State-based licensing 
systems on competition.
9
 
 
Economists would find such barriers to the free movement of labour to be inefficient.  
Access Economics addressed this issue in its recent paper, The Costs of Federalism:
10
 
 
The States often stop the right person from being in the right job – or at least make them go through 
duplicated regulatory hoops to do in one State something they have already qualified to practice in 
another State.  This is a big problem.  Each State and Territory grants licences to practice in lots of 
occupations.
11
  It is important to ensure that people have the necessary skills to practice particular 
occupations.  But it is rather less clear that the licensing practices and procedures couldn’t be much 
better co-ordinated and harmonised than they are … All too often, someone licensed in one State 
cannot readily practice in another.  That is typically a triumph of bureaucracy over common sense.  
And while some progress has been made in individual sectors towards overcoming the impediments to 
a mobile workforce arising from such State-based licensing systems, no consistent approach to 
resolving the problems has been devised.
12
 
 
As the Business Council of Australia noted recently in relation to restrictions on the 
labour market and business regulation more generally: 
 
                                                 
6
 P9, as well as to improve consistency in the regulatory requirements of jurisdictional industry 
regulatory authorities, provide a sound basis to improve the mutual recognition of occupational 
licences between jurisdictions, and provide a strong foundation from which to develop nationally 
consistent regulatory regimes. 
7
 P21. 
8
 Examples taken from ANTA Review of the Mutual Recognition Agreement – The Implications of 
Occupational Licensing for the Implementation of National Training Packages (Submission to the 
Productivity Commission from the Australian National Training Authority). 
9
 ‘Licensing has costs.  Apart from compliance and administration costs, by restricting entry, it can 
reduce competition with the usual adverse outcomes for consumers.  Hence, it is important that 
licensing is not over-used.  Of the total of nearly 100 occupations licensed by the States and Territories 
for consumer policy reasons, more than 30 are licensed in only one or two jurisdictions.  In some cases 
(eg hairdressing), the prima facie case for specific requirements seems very weak’: Review of 
Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework, Productivity Commission Inquiry Report, No 45, 30 April 
2008, p27.  
10
 (2006). 
11
 Builders, plumbers, electricians, electrical mechanics, fitters, engineers, installing, maintaining and 
servicing air conditioners and refrigeration, security guards, locksmiths, bodyguards, who can own a 
gun, aircraft engineers, and manager of investment products are all cited. 
12
 P30-31.  Treasury Secretary Ken Henry has also noted these issues, concluding that ‘we do not have 
a national labour market’, and citing occupations such as electricians and hairdressers where, although 
mutual recognition is in place, problems of categorisation in the case of electricians and of work 
experience requirements in the case of hairdressers, inhibit the transferability of such skills:  ‘Time to 
Get Real on National Productivity Reform in Productive Reform in a Federal System’, Roundtable 
Proceedings (2006), Productivity Commission. 
Unnecessarily complex business regulation means that businesses continue to face needless delays, 
increased compliance costs, more expensive inputs and difficulties in transferring staff to the places 
where they are most needed.  These differences create barriers to growth by making businesses more 
expensive to run, less able to expand, less inclined to develop new products and markets, less able to 
compete effectively and ultimately less profitable.  In turn, Australians face higher prices, fewer 
choices and more restricted employment opportunities than might otherwise be the case.  And the 
increased cost of administration for governments raises the tax burden for everyone. 
 
When all of this is added together, it is clear that our current regulatory systems helps prevent the 
Australian economy from operating at its potential.  They represent an antiquated and anachronistic 
framework that stands in direct contrast to Australia’s moves to reduce international regulatory barriers 
through the pursuit of its free trade agenda and other international economic arguments
13
 
 
Some have argued that the debate here reflects a larger debate between neo-classical 
economic thought, favouring decentralised economic policy and reduced national 
power to co-ordinate economic decision-making, and a Keynesian approach, 
favouring a macroeconomic view of the economy as an organic whole.
14
  Links can 
be seen between this debate and the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme 
Court.
15
 
 
The Business Council argues that businesses should be able to transfer willing 
employees to areas where they are needed, without having to worry whether their 
qualifications were transferable.  Businesses should be able to conduct the same 
business in different states, without having to re-apply for the same licences.
16
  This 
excess regulation makes it more difficult for Australian businesses to compete in 
international markets against companies from countries with less regulation.  It points 
to the substantial resources that must sometimes be devoted to compliance with the 
rules, causing some businesses to think twice about expanding, and resulting in an 
opportunity cost of economic activity foregone.
17
 
 
A Solution? The Interpretation of s92 of the Commonwealth Constitution 
Though we might hope that the above problems could be resolved through COAG, it 
will be suggested that another way in which the above challenge can be resolved is 
through s92 of the Commonwealth Constitution.  Section 92 of the Commonwealth 
                                                 
13
 Towards a Seamless Economy: Is  Regulation Keeping Up With the Changing Face of Business? 
(2008) p8, Business Council of Australia. 
14
 Steven Gey ‘The Political Economy of the Dormant Commerce Clause’ (1989) 17 New York 
University Review of Law and Social Change 1, 18,23; Gey refers to the ‘neo-classical axiom that the 
nation’s economy can be subdivided into local and national spheres, and the corresponding policy 
determination that the states should be given substantial responsibility for economic regulation’ (52). 
15
 In an early case, Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v Ogden (1824) 22 US 1 decided upon a broad 
definition of commerce, including commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations in all 
its branches; he refuted the suggestion that commerce was confined to traffic, buying or selling or the 
interchange of commodities.  Compare cases giving Congress narrower power over commerce, such as 
decisions prohibiting Congress from regulating corporate governance (Bank of Augusta v Earle)(1839) 
38 US 519; and Cooley v Board of Wardens (1851) 53 US 299. 
16
 P11. 
17
 P23.  The Business Council of Australia in its 2008 Report concludes that nothing has yet come of 
past COAG commitments to reform trade measurement, but notes a re-commitment by COAG in 
December 2007, in the form of a working party, to consider issues such as trade and professional 
recognition (p27).  Problems with the lack of harmonisation of the trade and professional licensing 
were also noted by the Business Council in its 2006 report Reshaping Australia’s Federation: A New 
Contract for Federal-State Relations (2006) and Business Council of Australia Intergovernmental 
Relations in Federal Systems (2006). 
Constitution is one of the most litigated sections, providing a guarantee that ‘trade, 
commerce and intercourse among the States shall be absolutely free’.  It is one of the 
key provisions of the Constitution, reflecting one of the key reasons for the creation of 
Australia – the concern to encourage free trade between the colonies under a common 
external tariff.  Much debate has concerned the question of identifying precisely what 
it is from which trade, commerce and intercourse are to be free.  There have been 
many challenges to State business regulations based on the section, and to a limited 
extent to Commonwealth regulations.  Perhaps the most famous use of the section was 
to thwart the Federal Government’s plans for a nationalised banking system in 
Australia.
18
  The section was radically re-interpreted in the 1988 Cole v Whitfield
19
 
decision to prohibit (only) laws that discriminated against interstate trade and 
commerce for protectionist purposes.
20
   
 
Recently, the section was used to strike down State legislation seeking to regulate an 
Internet betting regime operating from Tasmania.  The case reflects the first challenge 
to attempts by States to regulate Internet commerce.  It may herald the start of other 
such challenges, and it is submitted the case might have broader implications for the 
States in terms of business regulation.  I will explain the case and what it decided, 
before considering some of the possible implications of the decision.   
 
(a)  The Decision – Betfair Pty Limited v Western Australia21 
Betfair held a licence under Tasmanian law to operate a ‘betting exchange’.  Betfair 
uploaded onto its computer server information about each sporting event in Australia 
on which bets could be placed.  Registered customers of Betfair could call or email 
through bets to its Hobart headquarters.  This kind of betting differed from more 
orthodox betting, in that in effect customers were betting with one another rather than 
through a centralised body such as a TAB (often government-connected), or with a 
bookmaker.  Customers could bet on particular events happening or not happening.  
Some of Betfair’s customers were in Western Australia, and some of the events upon 
which Betfair took bets occurred in Western Australia.   
 
The Western Australian Parliament passed the Betting and Racing Legislation 
Amendment Act 2006 (WA), which inserted s24(1aa) and s27D(1) into the Betting 
Control Act 1954 (WA).  Section 24(1aa) made it an offence for a person to bet 
through a betting exchange.  Section 27D(1) of the Act made it an offence to publish 
or otherwise make available a Western Australian race field in the course of business, 
unless prior approval had been obtained.  Betfair had not obtained the required 
approval.  Betfair successfully challenged the amendments, arguing that they 
breached the s92 free trade and commerce protection enshrined in the Constitution. 
The result was unanimous.
22
 
                                                 
18
 Bank of New South Wales v Commonwealth (1948) 76 CLR 1. 
19
 (1988) 165 CLR 60; see for discussion Dennis Rose ‘Cole v Whitfield: ‘Absolutely’ Free Trade? In 
HP Lee and George Winterton ed Australian Constitutional Landmarks (2003). 
20
 Amelia Simpson ‘Grounding the High Court’s Modern Section 92 Jurisprudence: The Case for 
Improper Purpose as the Touchstone’ (2005) 33 Federal Law Review 445.  I will refer to literature 
critiquing the Cole test later in this article. 
21
 (2008) 234 CLR 418; refer for discussion to Eli Ball ‘Section 92 and the Regulation of E-Commerce: 
A Casenote on Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia’ (2008) 36 Federal Law Review 265; Amelia 
Simpson ‘Betfair Pty Ltd v Western Australia’ (2008) 19 Public Law Review 191. 
22
 Joint reasons were given by Gleeson CJ Gummow Kirby Hayne Crennan and Kiefel JJ, with Heydon 
J delivering a judgment with the same effect. 
 The court dismissed the arguments for Western Australia that appeared to assume that 
States had to retain an area over which they could pass business laws, even where 
laws regarding the Internet were concerned: 
 
To focus upon the geographic dimension given by State boundaries, when considering competition in a 
market in internet commerce, presents practical and conceptual difficulties.  Yet Western Australia and 
supporting State interveners emphasised that s92 permanently mandates that each State retain its own 
‘economic centre’.  That proposition, as will appear from what is said later in these reasons, is 
overbroad.
23
 
 
The joint reasons, in considering comments made by the court in its 1990 s92 decision 
Castlemaine Tooheys v South Australia,
24
 note that the earlier reasons  
 
Appear to discount the significance of movement of persons across Australia, and of instantaneous 
commercial communication, and to look back to a time of physically distinct communities located 
within colonial borders and separated by the tyranny of distance.
25
 
 
The joint reasons appeared to widen the immunity provided by s92.  The reasons 
referred to comments in Castlemaine that account would be taken of the ‘fundamental 
consideration’ that State legislatures had power to enact legislation for the well-being 
of its people.
26
  The joint reasons in Betfair concluded that such a consideration would 
not support much modern State regulatory legislation in the ‘new economy’.27 
 
In considering developments since its 1988 decision on s92, the joint reasons 
highlighted the National Competition Policy under the auspices of the Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG), including the guiding principle that legislation 
should not restrict competition, unless it can be shown that the benefits of the 
restrictions to the community as a whole outweighed the costs, and that the objectives 
of the legislation could only be achieved by restricting competition.
28
 
 
In the Court’s extensive use of economic literature in the case, it noted that one of the 
reasons for Australia federating was for trade reasons, and that political economists of 
the era had concluded that free commercial intercourse was one of the most 
distinctive marks of national unity.
29
  They concluded that 
 
                                                 
23
 452; the joint reasons referred to the new economy, in which internet-dependent businesses like the 
one considered here operate readily and deal with customers without regard to geographic boundaries 
(452). 
24
 (1990) 169 CLR 436 (Castlemaine). 
25
 453. 
26
 Mason CJ Brennan Deane Dawson and Toohey JJ (472). 
27
 474; as David McCann put it, ‘as the world globalises, barriers to the free movement of people, 
goods and services within Australia become increasingly anachronistic’: ‘First Head Revisited: A 
Single Industrial Relations System Under the Trade and Commerce Power’ (2006) 26 Sydney Law 
Review 75, 99-100; Geoffrey Sawer ‘if the result is eventually to leave the concept of ‘intrastate trade’ 
almost empty, as it now is in the United States, this is merely the inevitable consequence of national 
economic integration’: Australian Federalism in the Courts (1967) p206; or Gey: ‘in the modern world, 
every commercial activity is part of interstate commerce’: ‘The Political Economy of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause’ (1989) 17 New York University Review of Law and Social Change 1, 76.  
28
 452. 
29
 455, citing Sir Robert Palgrave Dictionary of Political Economy (1896) 2
nd
 ed p45-46. 
The creation and fostering of national markets would further the plan of the Constitution for the 
creation of a new federal union and would be expressive of national unity.
30
 
 
Sometimes State Governments could be susceptible to local pressures to make 
decisions adverse to those outside the state.
31
 
 
The joint reasons accepted that some regulation of interstate trade and commerce was 
necessary, and State laws operating in this field could be validated if they satisfied a 
criterion of ‘reasonable necessity’, which might be slightly more difficult to satisfy 
than previously expressed limits.
32
  The reasons admitted that the claimed objective of 
the Western Australian government in passing the law, supposedly to ‘preserve the 
integrity of betting’, might have some justification.  However, the total ban on betting 
exchanges and the prohibition on publishing lists was not proportionate or appropriate 
and adapted to the propounded legislative object.
33
 
 
(b) Free Movement of Labour and the Right to Trade Have Been Recognised 
Internationally 
 
The High Court of Australia has recently shown itself to be more willing to consider 
international developments in areas to which it turns its attention.
34
  Forces of 
globalisation have created an increased recognition that our legal challenges have, 
more often than not, been faced by other countries.  While the laws of a country are 
an expression of the sovereignty of its people, it makes sense in dealing with legal 
challenges to at least consider how these challenges have been dealt with elsewhere.  
The High Court in its Betfair decision referred to relevant American material, and it is 
submitted that the Australian law in this area could benefit from consideration of both 
European and American literature concerning the right of individuals to move around 
within a federation, and to provide services across jurisdictional boundaries, without 
undue restriction. 
 
In the European Union, the free movement of persons from one Member State to 
another is recognised as one of the four fundamental freedoms of Union law.  It is 
derived from Article 39 (freedom of movement for workers), Article 43 (freedom of 
                                                 
30
 452. 
31
 459; they cited here Professor Tribe: ‘that recognition reflects not a cynical view of the failings of 
statesmanship at a sub-federal level, but only an understanding that the proper structural role of state 
lawmakers is to protect and promote the interests of their own constituents.  That role is one that they 
will inevitably try to fulfil even at the expense of citizens of other states … in this context, the rhetoric 
of judicial deference to the democratically fashioned judgments of legislatures is often inapposite.  The 
checks on which we rely to curb the abuse of legislative power – election and recall – are simply 
unavailable to those who have no effective voice or vote in the jurisdiction which harms them.  This 
problem is most acute when a state enacts commercial laws that regulate extraterritorial trade, so that 
unrepresented outsiders are affected even if they do not cross the state’s borders’: American 
Constitutional Law (3
rd
 ed, 2000) 1051-1052.  
32
 In Cole v Whitfield, the court would have allowed ‘genuine’ State laws regulating commerce (403), 
where the law had a ’real object’ of prescribing standards (408); in Castlemaine Tooheys, the court 
used the concept of ‘acceptable explanation or justification’ (477) in Barley Marketing Board, the 
question was whether the burden on interstate trade was ‘incidental’ to the attainment of a non-
protectionist object and not disproportionate (199). 
33
 479. 
34
 For example, Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162. 
establishment), and Article 49 (freedom to provide services).
35
  Directives have been 
passed and cases decided in relation to general recognition of both professional 
education
36
 and vocational education,
37
 to the effect that these qualifications must be 
recognised in all member states, and another member state is not entitled to deny a 
person qualified in a member state on the basis of inadequate qualifications.
38
    State 
restrictions on the ability of a non-resident to practice in the State have been strictly 
limited.
39
  A European lawyer cannot be required to take more than one bar exam.
40
  
Each member state must recognise a company registered in another state, and cannot 
impose extra requirements on that company before allowing it to trade.
41
 
 
It has been recognised that the object of these provisions is to encourage the optimal 
allocation of resources within the Union and to maximise wealth creation.42 
                                                 
35
  So, for example, the requirement that an employer wishing to acquire an employee from another 
member state pay a fee was held to be offensive to Article 39:  Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge de 
Societes de Football Association and Others v Bosman [1995] ECR I-4921.  Individuals have a right to 
take up and pursue activities as self-employed persons and to set up businesses under the same 
conditions as those laid down for its own nationals by the law of the country where such establishment 
is effected.  There has been a move by the European Court of Justice to extend these rights of 
movement beyond merely economic rights, to include social and family rights:  Trojani v Centre 
Public d’Aide Sociale de Bruxelles (2004) ECR 7573; Collins v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions (2004) ECR 2703. 
36
 Directive 89/48 and 2001/19/EC; Council Directive 2004/38/EC, 2004 OJ (L158) 77; Reform of the 
System for the Recognition of Professional Qualifications (2005) European Commission; The 
European Qualifications Framework: A New Way to Understand Qualifications Across Europe (2006) 
European Commission; Reyners v Belgian State (1974) ECR 631. 
37
 Directive 92/51 and 2001/19/EC; Hocsman v Ministre de l’Emploi [2000] ECR I-6623. 
38
 Horatia Muir Watt ‘European Integration, Legal Diversity and the Conflict of Laws’ (2004) 9 
Edinburgh Law Review 6, 26.  Watt says that if one member state failed to recognise qualifications 
obtained in another state, it would destroy the competitive advantage conferred by the home state’s 
potentially different legislation. 
39
 The European Court of Justice found in Case C-55/94 Gebhard v Consiglio dell’Ordaine degli 
Avvocati e Procuratori di Milano [1995] ECR I-4165, that national measures liable to hinder or make 
less attractive the exercise of fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty (including the right to 
freedom of movement) were only valid if they (a) were applied in a non-discriminatory manner (b) 
were justified by imperative requirements in the public interest (c) must be suitable to attain the 
objective they pursue, and (d) they must not go beyond what is necessary to attain it.  A regulation 
requiring members of the Paris Bar to have only one office, and for it to be in France, was struck out by 
the European Court of Justice in Klopp v Orders des Avocats au Barreau de Paris Case 107/83 (1984) 
ECR 2971;  see for further discussion Paul Craig and Grainne De Burga EU Law: Text, Cases and 
Materials (3
rd
 ed, 2003) p772-785; Francesca Strumia ‘Citizenship and Free Movement: European and 
American Features of a Judicial Formula for Increased Comity’ (2006) 12 Columbia Journal of 
European Law 713, and Gonzalo Villalta Puig ‘Free Movement of Goods: The European Experience in 
the Australian Context’ (2001) 75 Australian Law Journal 639, and Gonzalo Villalta Puig ‘A European 
Saving Test for Section 92 of the Australian Constitution’ (2008) 13(1) Deakin Law Review 99. 
40
 Francesca Strumia ‘Citizenship and Free Movement: European and American Features of a Judicial 
Formula for Increased Comity’ (2006) 12 Columbia Journal of European Law 713, 749. 
41
 Kamer Van Koophandel en Fabrieken voor Amsterdam v Inspire Art Ltd [2003] ECR I-10155. 
42
 Paul Craig and Grainne de Burca EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (3
rd
 ed, 2003) p581.  To like 
effect see Chandra Shah and Michael Long  Labour Mobility and the Mutual Recognition of Skills and 
Qualifications: European Union and Australia/New Zealand , Working Paper No 65, Centre for the 
Economics of Education and Training, Monash University p4:  ‘The European Commission considers 
capacity for occupational mobility to be essential if the EU economy was to be efficient and 
competitive in the global market and if skills imbalances across sectors and regions were to be 
alleviated.  The critical factor in building this capacity requires the development of the human capital 
potential of the union’s citizens together with the processes for its recognition and transferability across 
borders’. 
 The experience in the United States is similar, and the High Court of Australia 
referred to the American equivalent provisions in its Betfair decision.  Clearly there 
are historical parallels in terms of the movement to federation and the concern for 
commercial wars between States.
43
  The right to freedom of interstate trade and 
commerce, and to movement around the federation, is recognised in at least three 
places within the United States Constitution.
44
  These provisions can be read together 
consistently as reflecting a desire to protect and promote the cohesiveness of the 
federal union.
45
  The obvious equivalents to these provisions in the Australian 
Constitution are s92
46
 and s117.
47
  
 
A recent United States Supreme Court decision referred to a citizen’s ‘right to travel’ 
protected by the privileges and immunities clause.
48
  Article 4 has been used to 
successfully attack State legislation imposing residency requirements or which 
provides lesser benefits or higher fees for non-residents.
49
  Under the dormant 
commerce clause, States’ requirements that sellers of particular products, such as 
liquor, have a State-issued licence have been struck down, even if the licence is 
potentially obtainable by the out of state business, because of the inferred 
                                                 
43
 Cole v Whitfield (1988) 165 CLR 360, 387 referring to intercolonial free trade as a ‘lion in the path’ 
of federation; H P Hood and Sons Inc v Du Mond (1949) 336 US 525, 533-534. 
44
 Article 1, Section 8 allows Congress to pass laws regulating interstate trade, and Article 4, Section 2 
and the Fourteenth Amendment provide that the citizens of each State shall be entitled to the privileges 
and immunities of citizens of the United States. 
45
 Jide Nzelibe ‘Free Movement: A Federalist Interpretation’ (1999) 49 American University Law 
Review 433, 445; Brannon Denning ‘Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV Cannot 
Replace the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine’ (2003) 88 Minnesota Law Review 384. 
46
 Murphy J expressly referred to the American authorities in terms of the constitutional right to travel 
in Miller v TCN Channel Nine Pty Ltd (1986) 161 CLR 556, 582 (he then compared these authorities 
with s92 jurisprudence in Australia). 
47
 The right to freedom from discrimination on the basis of residence – Mason CJ in the landmark s117 
case Street v Qld Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461 referred with approval to Article 4 and the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States (491).  Section 117 was inspired by the American 
provisions:  George Winterton, HP Lee, Arthur Glass and James Thomson Australian Federal 
Constitutional Law: Commentary and Materials (2
nd
 ed, 2007) p661; Pannam ‘Discrimination on the 
Basis of State Residence in Australia and the United States’ (1967) 6 Melbourne University Law 
Review 105.  I do not dwell in detail in this article on the requirements of s117, but there is a high 
degree of overlap between that section and s92, given that they both embrace a prohibition on 
discrimination against a thing or person that has the characteristic of interstatedness.  
48
 Saenz v Roe (1999) 526 US 489; the right was infringed by a Californian law restricting the welfare 
benefits available to a newly arrived resident compared with a  long-term resident; see also Shapiro v 
Thompson (1969) 394 US 618; United States v Guest (1966) 383 US 745; and Edwards v California 
(1941) 314 US 160; refer to Wilson Pasley ‘The Revival of Privileges and Immunities And the 
Controversy Over State Bar Admission Requirements: The Makings of a Future Constitutional 
Dilemma’ (2002) 11 William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal 1239. 
49
 Supreme Court v Piper (1985) 470 US 274 (inhouse residency requirements for bar membership 
invalid)(with obvious similarities to the Australian case Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 
168 CLR 461;  United Building and Construction Trades Council v Mayor of Camden (1984) 465 US 
208 (residency requirement for employment on state-funded projects invalid); Austin v New Hampshire 
(1975) 420 US 656 (state imposition of higher tax rate for non-residents invalid), Saenz v Roe (1999) 
526 US 489 (lower benefits to newly arrived residents of California compared with benefits to long-
term residents invalid); and Toomer 334 US 396 (higher commercial shrimp licence fees for 
nonresidents invalid); refer to Gillian Metzger ‘Congress, Article IV and Interstate Relations’ (2007) 
120 Harvard Law Review 1468. 
protectionist purpose of the legislation.
50
  A State requirement that an out of state 
liquor seller have some physical presence in the State in order to sell online to 
customers there has been recently struck down as contrary to the dormant commerce 
clause, on the basis of discrimination against interstate traders.
51
  The Supreme Court 
considered the scheme raised the costs for out-of-state producers which would likely 
be passed on to customers and make their products less financially viable.  Arguments 
by the States that they were trying to discourage purchase of alcohol online by minors 
(and so the legislation was legitimate regulation) were not accepted.
52
   
 
Legislation can be attacked by use of  the dormant commerce clause either because it 
discriminates against interstate trade and commerce, or because it unreasonably 
burdens interstate commerce.
53
  Links have been acknowledged with competition 
here.
54
   
 
Considering to a Rhode Island statute which defined debt collecting as law practice 
and then limited such collecting to licensed Rhode Island lawyers, the First Circuit 
found the law unconstitutional under the dormant commerce clause: 
 
By defining all debt collection as the practice of law, and limiting this practice to members of the 
Rhode Island bar, Rhode Island effectively (barred) out of staters from offering a commercial service 
within its borders and confer(red) the right to provide that service – and to reap the associated 
economic benefit – upon a class largely composed of Rhode Island citizens.55 
 
                                                 
50
 Heald v Engler 342 F 3d 517 (6
th
 Cir, 2003), cert denied, Dickerson v Bailey 336 F 3d 388 (5
th
 Cir, 
2003); and Beskind v Easley 325 F 3d 506 (4
th
 Cir, 2003); the possible applicability of the Twenty-First 
Amendment is outside the scope of this article. 
51
 Note that discrimination has held, although it could have been argued that the requirements of 
presence within the State applied equally to interstate and local traders. 
52
 Granholm v Heald (2005) 544 US 460 (Kennedy Scalia Souter Ginsburg and Breyer JJ; Rehnquist 
CJ Stevens O’Connor Thomas JJ dissenting); the court also referred to the fact that the legislation 
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54
 Justice Cardozo found that the commerce clause forbade a state law burdening interstate trade and 
commerce ‘when the avowed purpose of the law as well as its necessary tendency is to suppress or 
mitigate the consequences of competition between the States’:  Baldwin v GAF Seelig Inc (1935) 294 
US 511. 
55
 National Revenue Corp v Violet 807 F 2d 285 (1
st
 Cir, 1986).  As Charles Wolfram puts it ‘the states 
(today) are by and large quite restrictive about admitting out of state lawyers … The reasons given for 
the restrictions are probably largely pious eyewash.  The real motivation, one strongly suspects, has to 
do with cutting down on the economic threat posed for in-state lawyers … by competition with out of 
state lawyers:  ‘Sneaking Around in the Legal Profession: Interjurisdictional Unauthorised Practice by 
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Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics 135; cf Dent v State of West Virginia (1889) 129 US 114, where 
the Supreme Court upheld the right of a state to require proof of evidence of a certain level of skill and 
knowledge in order to practice a profession.  The dominant view in the United States mirrors the High 
Court of Australia’s rejection of residency requirements as a basis for practising law within an 
Australian jurisdiction, under s117: Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461. 
The right of a citizen to live and work where he/she wishes, to earn a living by any 
lawful means, and to pursue any vocation, has also been recognised by the Supreme 
Court as protected by the Constitution.
56
  An ordinance requiring an employer of any 
person moving into the area, or changing jobs in the area, to obtain identifying 
particulars such as fingerprints from their new employees have been struck out.
57
  The 
court has found that people may come within the definition of commerce.
58
 
 
(c) Some Australian Precedents    
There have been some past examples where the High Court and Privy Council have 
considered State business licensing schemes in the context of s92.  These cases pre-
date the 1988 watershed decision in Cole, and for this reason their continuing 
correctness must be firmly questioned, but some of the issues with which earlier cases 
grappled remain current post-Cole.  For example, it has always been accepted, and 
continues to be accepted, that the section cannot be read and applied literally to 
proscribe any laws that impact interstate trade and commerce.  It has been the case, 
and continues to be the case, that at least some state regulation is acceptable.  The 
question is always where the line should be drawn.  The examples below suggest 
where the line has been drawn in contexts relevant to the focus of this article. 
 
Perhaps the leading example was Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v State of New South 
Wales
59
, where New South Wales transport regulations here prohibited a person from 
operating a public motor vehicle without a licence.  A public motor vehicle was 
defined as one that was used in the course of any trade or business.  In considering an 
application, the Act provided for the licensing authority to have regard to various 
factors in assessing the application.  A unanimous Privy Council struck down the Act 
as being offensive to s92.  The Privy Council discussed building by-laws providing 
that compliance with them gave the lodger an as-of-right approval to commence work.  
Such an approach would be valid, but 
 
Such a law differs vitally from a prohibition subject to obtaining a licence which may be granted or 
withheld at discretion.  The only reason why such a system would not be regarded as satisfactory in 
such legislation is that such legislation is not really concerned – or at any rate is by no means solely 
concerned – with the safety of public transport.  It is concerned very largely with restricting the 
development, in competition with existing railways, of modern and convenient methods of transport, 
and one of its supposed advantages is that the discretion to withhold licences can be used to protect the 
trade of one State at the expense of another.  It is, for example, obviously within the sphere of practical 
politics that it should be thought in Melbourne that Cootamundra ought to drink Victorian beer and not 
South Australian beer.  The protection of the industries of one State against those of another State was, 
of course, one of the primary things which s92 was designed to prevent, but if the legislation now in 
question is valid, effect can easily be given to such an opinion without anybody knowing anything 
about it.
60
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 In North Eastern Dairy Co Limited and Dairy Authority of New South Wales,
61
 a 
Victorian milk producer sold milk to customers in New South Wales, contrary to New 
South Wales provisions requiring that any milk sold in the state be pasteurised by the 
holder of a New South Wales licence.  This milk had not been so pasteurised.  A 
majority of the Court found the legislation to be invalid due to s92.  Barwick CJ found 
the legislation was attempting to monopolise the supply of milk by New South Wales 
producers.
62
  Although it was laudable to seek to provide wholesome milk, as was 
arguably the purpose of this legislation, it was not the only practical way to achieve 
that purpose.
63
  It was not established that milk pasteurised in accord with Victorian 
law was less wholesome than that of New South Wales.
64
  The regulations directly 
produced the result that a trade could not lawfully sell within the State a commodity 
of commerce, except on terms dictated by the State.
65
   
 
Mason J referred to a test of discrimination that would later find support by the 
unanimous court in Cole: 
 
The legislature has selected a mode of regulation which .. is calculated to burden, indeed to destroy, the 
interstate trade in pasteurised milk, in preference to other modes of regulation which would involve no 
discrimination against the Victorian product.  As the defendant has failed to show that the 
discriminatory mode of regulation selected is necessary for the protection of public health, it is in my 
judgment not a reasonable regulation of the interstate trade in pasteurised milk.
66
 
 
It can be noted here that Mason J found the State regulation discriminatory against 
interstate trade, although the requirement that milk be pasteurised by a licence holder 
applied regardless of the source from which the milk came. 
 
In Boyd v Carah Coaches Proprietary Limited,
67
 New South Wales regulations 
prohibited an individual or firm from carrying on business as a travel agent unless 
they held a licence.  The regulations established a Travel Agents Registration Board, 
empowering it to issue licences.  Several criteria were noted as the basis for the 
exercise of the Board’s discretion, including whether or not the applicant was a fit and 
proper person to hold such a licence, and the adequacy of the applicant’s educational 
                                                                                                                                            
safety or to deter competition.  The quote also refers to the understandable tendency for a regional 
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 (1979) 145 CLR 78; similar issues arose and a similar result ensued in Perre v Pollitt (1975) 135 
CLR 139. 
attainments or experience.  Again, a majority of the High Court struck out the 
regulations as offensive to s92. 
 
Gibbs J for example found that a statutory provision forbidding a person from 
carrying on an ordinary trade without a licence, and giving the licensing authority an 
uncontrolled discretion to refuse to grant a licence, could not be applied to interstate 
trade due to s92.
68
  He objected to the ‘fit and proper’ criterion as involving an overly 
wide discretion.
69
  Similarly, Mason J objected to the power of the Board to refuse a 
licence on arbitrary and unspecified grounds which could be obnoxious to the concept 
of free trade guaranteed by s92.
70
 
 
Though most of the past cases have concerned the trade and commerce aspect of s92, 
I should note that the section also protects ‘intercourse’ among the States.  The High 
Court in Cole suggested a broader view of the protection to be given to the intercourse 
aspect of the section 
 
A constitutional guarantee of freedom of interstate intercourse, if it is to have substantial content, 
extends to a guarantee of personal freedom to pass to and fro among the State without burden, 
hindrance or restriction.
71
 
 
Subsequent High Court decisions on the intercourse aspect of s92 have focussed on 
whether the purpose of the law is to burden interstate intercourse, and whether the 
impediment to such intercourse is greater than is reasonably necessary in order to 
secure a legitimate object.
72
   
 
There are several precedent examples then where the High Court has struck out 
business licensing schemes on the basis that their requirements are offensive to the 
economic unity that was envisaged by the founding fathers in constructing the s92 
freedom.  While the test for invalidity of a provision under s92 has changed, these 
cases can still be used to support an argument as to the invalidity of state licensing 
schemes, given that there are comments in the cases couched in the language of 
discrimination and protectionism. 
 
3.  Future Work for s92 to do 
Members of the High Court in the recent Betfair case have shown they are willing to 
recognise the requirements and realities of the ‘new economy’ in interpreting s92 of 
the Constitution.  Business groups have been saying consistently that the economic 
realities of the 21
st
 century in Australia today require that we move away from a 
State-based occupational licence regime, in order to free up labour to move to where 
it is most needed, and to where it can more efficiently be utilised.  Again, this is not a 
problem that is unique to Australia.  Other federations such as the United States and 
                                                 
68
 84. 
69
 85. 
70
 97. 
71
 Cole, p393; it seemed at that stage that the right to freedom of intercourse was to be considered quite 
separately and distinctly from the right to freedom of trade and commerce (388).  The right is similar to 
the privileges and immunities doctrine in the United States, which as has been discussed above, has 
been interpreted to guarantee freedom of movement. 
72
 APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW)(2005) 219 ALR 403; Cunliffe v Commomwealth 
(1994) 182 CLR 272:  James Stellios ‘The Intercourse Limb of Section 92 and the High Court’s 
Decision in APLA Ltd v Legal Services Commissioner (NSW)(2006) 17 Public Law Review 10. 
the European Union have recognised the right of a worker to move freely within the 
federation for work purposes, and to have their qualifications and skills recognised in 
the new state.  This right is not absolute, but restrictions on such a freedom must find 
strong justification.  This is for sound economic reasons.  Although we are always 
wary about applying solutions in other countries without adaptation to reflect local 
requirements, and accepting that the constitutional provisions are expressed in 
different terms, it is submitted that like the other jurisdictions Australia needs to 
protect this right.  The High Court clearly has the ability to do so through its 
interpretation of s92 of the Australian Constitution.   
 
It is submitted that State-based licensing regimes remain vulnerable to challenge 
under s92 of the Constitution utilising the current interpretation given to the section, 
as they have been challenged in the past.   
 
Example
73
 
Assume Rob is a licensed electrician in Western Australia, and wishes to work as an 
electrician in Queensland.  If Queensland regulations required him to undergo further 
training to be able to work as an electrician in that State, or did not recognise his 
experience in Western Australia as being relevant for any work experience 
requirements to obtain registration in Queensland, the Queensland regulations might 
be challengeable on (at least) two bases:
74
 
 
(a) that they interfere with freedom of intercourse among the States as it applies to 
Rob, on the basis that the reason Rob would be moving to Queensland would be for 
work reasons, and if there are barriers in him being able to work here, he is less likely 
to move; 
(b) if Rob intends to move to Queensland permanently, that such restrictions interfere 
with trade and commerce among the States, by burdening someone who wishes to 
move between states for business purposes.  American authorities establish that 
people can be commerce.
75
 
If Rob wished to remain resident in Western Australia but merely fly to Queensland to 
work on some projects, as many service providers do, these regulations would even 
more seriously burden interstate trade and commerce. 
 
It is arguable that these State-based licensing schemes are at least prima facie 
designed to inhibit competition for work in the State imposing the requirements.  The 
courts have been willing to go behind the claimed justification for laudable-sounding 
laws, to find out their real motivation.  In Hughes and North Eastern Dairy, the Court 
found as a fact that business licensing schemes had been passed for protectionist 
reasons.  The High Court of Australia in Betfair and the United States Supreme Court 
has referred to the need, in interpreting these kinds of provisions, to allow competition 
if at all possible.  Removing State-based restrictions on the right to practice a 
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 Hughes. 
particular profession or trade, or at the very least requiring very strong justification for 
their retention, would assist in encouraging competition among labour, and among 
service providers.  It is sensible to interpret legal rules to provide for economically 
desirable outcomes. 
 
The States will probably seek to justify their regimes on non-protectionist grounds.  
The High Court’s ‘reasonable necessity’ test to be passed over these arguments.  It 
would be expected to be a rare case where this test would be satisfied.  For example, it 
is hard to think of a genuine argument why a person licensed as a refrigeration 
mechanic in New South Wales would not have an automatic right to perform the same 
task in Victoria.  Support for this approach is evident in past High Court decisions on 
s92, which recognised the potential for State-based licensing regimes to be anti-
competitive.    
 
Some might argue that a State-based licensing regime is not discriminatory, since it 
applies to those who have lived locally for a long time, as well as those who were 
licensed in another jurisdiction and have recently moved states.  It is true the court has 
required that there be discrimination in order that an Act breach s92.
76
  However, as 
indicated Mason J in North Eastern Dairy (who used the concept of discrimination in 
assessing the Act’s validity under s92,)77 found that although in that case the 
requirement to have milk sold certified by a licensed pasteuriser applied regardless of 
where the milk came from, the Act was discriminatory,
78
 providing an extra burden 
on the interstate trade.   
 
Further, recall that the provisions successfully challenged in Betfair did not apparently 
single out interstate trade and commerce for discriminatory treatment, yet were struck 
down.  Further, in the s117 case Street v Queensland Bar Association, the High Court 
found a residency requirement for practice in Queensland to be discriminatory 
contrary to that section.  The fact that the residency requirement applied to both local 
and interstate barriers did not save the requirement from invalidity.
79
  There is no 
evidence that the concepts of freedom from discrimination are to be applied 
differently in the context of s92 and s117 and so they are not considered here as 
separate arguments. 
 
In the same way, regulations stating that a person who has obtained a particularl 
qualification or trade and the right to practice in a field in one Australian jurisdiction 
must undergo further training or qualifications in another jurisdiction before 
practising there are also seen to be discriminatory.  They require them to jump 
through two hoops – the requirements of the jurisdiction from whence they have come, 
and the jurisdiction in which they are now seeking registration.  The two hoop or 
double burden concept was recognised recently in the context of the European Union: 
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The posting of a worker could not require the employer to comply with a second set of territorially 
applicable rules … in addition to those already complied with in the home country (unless there was a 
general interest justification for doing so).  In all these cases, the double burden test works without 
difficulty; mutual recognition serves to protect a competitive advantage acquired under the rules 
applicable in the home state
80
  (emphasis added) 
 
Analogously (given the above quote), in the s92 case of Bath v Alston Holdings Pty 
Ltd,
81
 a majority of the High Court invalidated a taxation provision that had the effect 
of removing a competitive advantage that lower cost interstate goods had. 
  
As indicated above, on the current interpretations given to discrimination in s92 and 
s117, such a requirement will be found to be discriminatory.  We would then consider  
whether the discrimination was justified – the High Court’s ‘reasonable necessity’ test 
in Betfair.  The State would have to make their case, in the interests presumably of 
public safety or health.  It would be hard to argue this when another State has 
presumably made the assessment on similar grounds.   Very strong evidence would 
need to be led and the prima facie position would be that such laws were 
protectionist.
82
  If there is evidence that at least one founding father did not intend s92 
to apply to such licensing regimes,
83
 this is not considered determinative of how the 
section can be applied to a very different economy in the early years of the 21
st
 
century.
84
 
 
The High Court in s92 has been concerned, in applying the ‘reasonable necessity’ test, 
with whether the claimed objectives of the legislation could be achieved in a manner 
that was less offensive to competition than the provisions of the challenged 
legislation.
85
  Given the move to national standards in particular fields, I might 
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suggest that if States have genuine concerns about the standards that should be 
required to enter particular trades or professions, a legitimate way to express these 
concerns is when the national standards are being developed, rather than trying to go 
it alone with their own regulations. 
 
Should Evidence of a ‘Protectionist Purpose’ Be Necessary in Applying s92? 
The above discussion is premised on the basis of a need to prove that State-based 
licensing systems were introduced at least partly for protectionist purposes, given this 
is the current law on section 92.  As indicated, there is precedent for such schemes 
being viewed in this light.   
 
However, it is worth pointing out that others have questioned whether there should be 
a need to prove a protectionist purpose in order that a law be found to have breached 
section 92.  They argue that the section was included in the Constitution in order to 
create a common market.  The argument is that consistently with this purpose, laws 
which discriminate against interstate trade and commerce should be prima facie struck 
out as offensive to section 92, whether or not a purpose of protectionism can be 
shown.  As one of the leading advocates of this reform measure argues, 
 
The narrowness of the scope (of the existing test) excludes many laws and measures from the 
jurisdiction of s92 even though their purpose and effect may be to restrict the common market.
86
 
 
These authors believe that section 92 was included in the Constitution with the 
intention that it would provide for a common market.  This view is inconsistent with 
the view of history taken by the High Court in Cole, but enjoys some support among 
other commentators,
87
 as well as being reflected in views of judges
88
 in some s92 
cases.  A leading commentator on s92 jurisprudence acknowledges that the current 
discriminatory protectionism test has its limitations: 
 
The Court assumes a narrower role as the enforcer of one aspect of the achievement of economic unity 
in a federal system, the prevention of state protectionism resulting from the imposition of 
discriminatory burdens on interstate trade … (As a result) other kinds of laws or practices that detract 
from the achievement of an internal common market or otherwise threaten national economic unity 
(usually state laws or actions) may require different remedies such as overriding national legislation or 
uniform agreement among the States.
89
 
 
It is not proposed to dwell here on this discussion here since it is not the main focus of 
this article, but certainly it would be easier to challenge State-based licensing systems 
on the basis of s92 if it were not necessary to show a purpose of protectionism.  
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Mutual recognition of a business or occupational licence might be more consistent 
with the common market of which those above spoke in framing their views on the 
interpretation of, and true purpose of, s92. 
 
Conclusion 
The recent High Court of Australia Betfair decision has raised hopes that State-based 
licensing regimes could be challenged on the basis of the s92 freedom.  A broader 
interpretation of freedom of movement around Australia for work purposes, and a 
consequent stringent approach to considering obstacles in the path of workers who 
wish to exercise that right, would be consistent with the approach taken in two other 
leading federations of the world.  It is justified on economic efficiency grounds by 
having capital and labour move to more efficient uses.  It might better reflect the 
vision of the founding fathers that s92 would serve to create a common market in 
Australia. 
 
Business groups have sought greater integration of Australia’s labour force, and have 
pointed to State-based licensing regimes as creating barriers and inhibiting business 
potential.  While the law should not necessarily be applied in a way that businesses 
always want, all Australians benefit when companies based in Australia can operate 
more efficiently.  Thus, State licensing schemes that do not recognise (truly) 
equivalent qualifications or experience gained elsewhere in Australia are 
discriminatory on the two-hoops thesis.  A State can argue for such a regime, but 
should be required to present very strong evidence as to how the laws meet the 
‘reasonable necessity’ bar.  The law can be interpreted in a way that meets sound 
economic goals for the Australian federal system early in its second century. 
 
 
